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SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED RESULTS OF SEPTEMBER 13 GAERC

REF: A. STATE 193154

[B](#). BRUSSELS 3822

[C](#). USEU TODAY 09/08/2004

Classified By: Kyle Scott, PolMinCouns, Reasons 1.4 (B/D)

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) We have discussed reftel A points on the EU FMs' General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting on Sept. 13 with a variety of EU officials. EU Conclusions on Sudan should dovetail with the main elements of our draft UNSC Resolution. On Iran, we understand the EU will issue a statement (although perhaps not formal Conclusions) calling on Iran to comply with its IAEA obligations. For Iraq, EU officials expect that EU Member State contributions will cover a substantial part, if not all, of the funds needed for the UN force, and are talking to the UN about additional support for elections. Iraqi PM Allawi will be invited to the EU's November 5 Summit. The GAERC will also formally approve, without discussion, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the upcoming EU force in Bosnia. Other issues that should be covered at the GAERC are Burma, Belarus, the Great Lakes and (possibly) Serbia.
END SUMMARY.

Sudan/Darfur

[1](#)2. (C) Council officials shared with us the draft conclusions on Sudan being prepared for the September 13 GAERC. Although minor adjustments may still be made, we were told the main elements are already agreed. They dovetail with the main elements of our draft UNSC resolution, including:
-- a call for a moratorium on all military air operations;
-- a statement of dissatisfaction with Sudanese implementation of its commitments to disarm militia groups;
-- concerns about "continuing reports about massive human rights violations, including systematic rape of women;
-- support for creation of an international commission of inquiry;
-- willingness to further support an expansion of the AU observer mission; and
-- a warning of possible sanctions against the GoS if no tangible progress is made.
The EU will also dispatch a fact-finding mission to see where additional EU support may be needed.

EU will issue statement on Iran

[1](#)3. (C) While Dutch PermRep de Bruijn has told a background press briefing that Iran will be discussed in restricted session at lunch, and lead to no formal Conclusions, according to Council Secretariat officials Sophie Kisling and Andreas Strub, who work respectively on Iran and Non-Proliferation issues, EU ministers will issue a statement on Iran on the margins of the GAERC. The statement, which Strub had just drafted, will call on Iran to comply with IAEA guidelines and its international obligations, consistent with the EU's long-standing policy on Iran's nuclear program. Ministers will seek to agree on a common press line on Iran, which will express support for the EU-3 efforts, and which will coincide with the start of the IAEA Board meeting.

Strub said he understood that the EU-3 continue to work on a common text for a proposed IAEA Board resolution on Iran, and will brief ministers at the GAERC.

14. (C) On the issue of referring Iran to the UNSC, Strub said the recent IAEA DG's report "could have been worse" for Iran. It shows, he said, some Iranian responsiveness to the IAEA. For example, the issue of contamination, he said, may never be clarified without Iran's suppliers coming clean on what they provided Iran -- and moving the issue to the Security Council, where Russia is a member -- won't necessarily help. In Strub's view, moving the issue to the Security Council will require carefully defining what Iran must do to comply with the IAEA: exactly which dual-use activities will the UNSC insist Iran halt, which will be permitted, and will these standards apply to other countries (e.g. Israel)? How the UNSC frames these issues will influence Iran's response, Strub said, and this should be carefully considered before moving to the UNSC.

Iraq: Funding UN Security Force

15. (C) The GAERC Conclusions on Iraq have already been agreed at PermRep level and will endorse the EU's plan to meet with the Iraqi Interim Government in New York during UNGA week, as well as an invitation to PM Allawi to attend the November 5 EU Summit in Brussels. A discussion of the Italian and French hostages in Iraq is also expected. Kisling, who also covers Iraq at the Council, said that the legal basis for funding Iraq does not allow funding for military operations, although the Commission, Council and member states are looking carefully at this issue. She said a legal brief is being prepared, but she has not seen it. At present, the best option is for funding to come from member states, as Dutch FM Bot has asked them to do. She said the Dutch have a contribution in mind, and the Germans are willing to use some of their pledge for election support to fund the UN protection force. Other member states are working in capitals to see what they can pledge, and this will be discussed at the GAERC. Kisling commented that the sum in question -- \$26 million -- was not huge; she did not know if member states would make up the full amount but thought it likely they would cover a substantial part of this sum.

Iraq: UN Election Appeal

16. (C) Kisling said the Commission has pledged 15 million euros, and is talking to the UN and the Iraqi Election Commission. The EU is not likely to fund the entire shortfall, she said, but the Commission was talking to the UN about reallocating some of its 2004 80 million euro contribution to the UN Trust Fund (under the International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq) for election support.

Iraq: Election Observation -- maybe a lite version

17. (C) Kisling said that Iraq is on the EU's list for possible observation, but all is contingent on the security situation. Commissioner Patten is dead set against sending EU personnel to Iraq, so she did not foresee an election observation mission under the current Commission (whose tenure ends November 1). She thought perhaps the EU could send election experts and, at the most, possibly offer the kind of monitoring that it has undertaken in Afghanistan, but this was her personal opinion. A parliament contact told

us security
concerns would result in few MEP volunteers for an
observation mission.
Operation Althea: Bosnia Handover

18. (C) The CONOPS has been finalized by the PSC and should be approved at the September 13 GAERC as an "A point" (adopted without any discussion). We have been assured by planners within the EU Military Staff that things are moving forward as anticipated. A force generation conference is scheduled for September 15, and an OPLAN should be completed shortly. The EU Military Committee should sign off on the OPLAN by the end of September. While there remains some uncertainty about the date for the Transfer of Authority, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is aware of US plans to depart MNB North on November 30, and they are keen to avoid any gaps in on-the-ground presence. A formal decision by the EU to launch the operation is expected in November. That decision will establish an official takeover date.

Other Issues: Burma, Belarus, Great Lakes, and Serbia

19. (C) PermRep de Bruijn said the Presidency "expects that (the Gymnich) conclusions will be confirmed" on EU consideration of tougher measures against Burma (Ref B), despite reports of French objections (French FM Barnier was unable to attend the Gymnich meeting) in particular to proposed restrictions on EU companies investing in named Burmese state-owned enterprises. A Council staffer told us that bilateral discussions between Barnier and Dutch FM Bot would likely continue over the weekend, and that a last minute PermRep Committee (COREPER) meeting early in the morning on Sept. 13 was still possible. But the UK and others have signaled clearly they have no margin for flexibility to back down vis-a-vis Burma at this point.

110. (C) Due in particular to the insistence at least one of the Baltic states, the GAERC will also consider how the EU should respond to Belarusian President Lukashenko's announcement of an impending referendum there. A Dutch Presidency source told us that the Political and Security Committee has prepared a forceful message to be issued as Council conclusions. As reported REF C, the EU's Political and Security Committee has agreed the EU should impose travel restrictions on Belarus officials, although we are told the final list will likely be decided after the GAERC.

111. (SBU) The FMs' luncheon on Sept. 13 will also cover the situation in the Great Lakes region in Africa, in particular the government crisis in Kinshasa, but no decisions or Conclusions are anticipated. EU member states are still seeking an agreed approach on MONUC renewal. The key question is whether to extend the existing mission, or seek to reinforce it. Finally, the Hungarian government was pushing add the treatment of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the Serbian province of Vojvodina to the GAERC agenda. According to our source, there was no enthusiasm from other EU Member States for raising the issue to the ministerial level at this point, but Budapest "appeared intent" on forcing a discussion of the issue.

112. (U) Minimize considered.

SCHNABEL